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I. Campaign Finance Practices and Problems
The financing of political campaigns in California is, in substantial
measure, inadequate, discriminatory, and corrupt. It is a serious prob-
lem in the state's political system.
In general, present methods of campaign financing do not provide
enough money for communication by candidates with voters. This in-
adequacy limits electoral competition and officeholder accountability,
and it restricts public knowledge and participation in politics. Many
candidates with potentially substantial electoral support do not receive
sufficient funds. Fundraising takes an inordinate share of the time and
efforts of candidates and key supporters, thereby displacing other cam-
paign or official activities valuable to the public.
The existing financing system discriminates heavily in favor of
those with wealth in the election of officials. Candidates or potential
candidates without wealth or access to affluent backers are often at a
decisive disadvantage. Most seriously, large contributors or potential
contributors have special access to and undue influence with govern-
ment decisionmakers. The financing system is repellent to a substantial
part of the public. It deters public participation in politics and impairs
respect and confidence in government.
At the same time, however, the present methods do permit those
organizations and individuals with the means and desire to participate
freely in the political process by making campaign contributions and
expenditures. A large and increasing amount of money is raised from
diverse sources, and some campaigns are financed adequately. Much
of the money is given without conditions or serious expectation of fa-
voritism. By limiting the number of candidates, existing methods of
financing counteract lax statutory requirements for ballot access. Ordi-
* Professor of Law, Stanford University; Director, California Common Cause; Co-
author of the California Political Reform Act of 1974. A.B., 1953, University of Washing-
ton; LL.B., 1956, Harvard University.
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narily, a person must be able to raise or personally put up substantial
amounts of money in order to be a serious candidate.
Political campaigns are financed in California, as in the United
States generally, primarily by private contributions.' There is no direct
financing by the government, with the important exception that incum-
bents make appreciable use of public employees, property, and mail-
ings in campaign-related activities. Indirectly, the government
subsidizes candidates through federal tax credits and state tax deduc-
tions for campaign contributions.2
There are almost no significant restrictions in California on the
sources or amounts of contributions to candidates for state offices. In
contrast to a number of other states, there are no prohibitions on corpo-
ration or union gifts.3 The California Political Reform Act,4 adopted
by initiative in 1974, forbade contributions by paid "lobbyists" to can-
didates for any state office;5 but that restriction was held unconstitu-
tional because it was too great an infringement upon lobbyists' freedom
of political association.6 The one significant restriction on contribu-
tions under California statutes is that political parties are barred from
contributing to candidates for party nominations in primary elections.7
There are no significant restrictions on expenditures by candidates
or by others in elections for state offices, again except for a prohibition
1. Presidential elections are a major exception. Under the Federal Election Campaign
Act, presidential candidates may choose exclusive government treasury financing of their
campaigns in the general election, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003, 9004 (1976), and partial public treas-
ury financing in primaries, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9034, 9033 (1976).
Eleven states now provide public treasury financing for some state offices or for political
parties. See H. ALEXANDER & J. FRUTIG, PUBLIC FINANCING OF STATE ELECTIONS (1982);
Fed. Election Comm'n, Campaign Finance Law 81, Chart C (1981). Generally, the amount
of public funding is dependent on the number of taxpayers who designate that one or two
dollars of their income taxes be used to finance campaigns or parties. Amounts designated
have been relatively small, although not insignificant. H. ALEXANDER & J. FRUTIG, supra.
In Michigan and New Jersey there has been substantial public funding for gubernatorial
primary and general elections. Id. at 114, 172-73.
2. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
3. See Fed. Election Comm'n, Campaign Finance Law 81, Chart B (1981).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE, §§ 81000-91014 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983).
5. Id. at § 86202.
6. Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d. 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157
Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
7. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11702 (West 1977). This prohibition is probably invalid as an
infringement on the constitutional right of political association of the parties and their mem-
bers. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Demo-
cratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Abrams v. Reno, 452 F. Supp. 1166
(S.D. Fla. 1978), aft'd, 649 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
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on expenditures by political parties in primary elections.8 The Califor-
nia Political Reform Act did restrict the amount candidates could
spend on elections for governor and other statewide offices,9 but in
Buckley v. Valeo,' ° the United States Supreme Court held that candi-
date expenditure limits violate the First Amendment," unless the limits
are imposed as a condition on receipt of public treasury payments for
campaign expenses.'
2
The Political Reform Act does require candidates and others to
keep records and make extensive public disclosure of campaign contri-
butions and expenditures, including disclosure at several intervals prior
to elections.' 3 The name, address, occupation, and business or em-
ployer of contributors of $100 or more and the amount of their contri-
butions must be divulged.' 4 The reporting requirements are
administered by an independent agency, the Fair Political Practices
Commission (FPPC). The Commission has considerable rulemaking
and enforcement powers, as well as a guarantee of substantial fund-
ing."' To date, there apparently has been a high level of compliance
with the reporting requirements, and a great amount of campaign fi-
nance information has been disclosed regularly.1
6
There has been a huge increase in campaign contributions and ex-
penditures for state offices over the past two decades, although the cost
per voter remains modest. Inflation and population growth have been
major factors in the increase, but there has been a sharp rise even in
constant dollars expended per registered voter.'7 A substantial propor-
8. This prohibition also seems constitutionally vulnerable. See First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) and the cases cited supra note 7.
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 85100-85305 (West 1976) (repealed 1977).
10. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
11. Id. at 54-59.
12. Id. at 57 n.65.
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 84100-84305 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983).
14. Id. at § 84211(f).
15. Id. at §§ 83100-83122.
16. The FPPC publishes voluminous information on campaign finance. Prior to elec-
tions it provides the aggregate contributions received and expenditures made by candidates
for state offices, and itemizes the large contributions made to each candidate. After each
primary and general election, it publishes reports on campaign receipts and expenditures by
state candidates. These documents include total receipts, total expenditures, cash on hand
for candidates, lists of each candidate's donors of $100 or more, the breakdowns of the
general sources of a candidate's contributions (e.g., business, labor, agriculture, other candi-
dates), contributions by major donors, and expenditures by independent committees. As the
following notes illustrate, the commission has also published a number of special studies on
various aspects of campaign finance.
17. In 1958, all candidates for state offices and their affiliated committees reportedly
spent $5.6 million. By 1978, the expenditures were $42.7 million-an increase of 633%.
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tion of total contributions is from relatively large contributors.' 8 The
share from corporations, trade and professional organizations, and
FPPC, Campaign Costs: How Much Have They Increased and *ly? .4 Study of State Elec-
tions, 1958-1978 2, table 1 (1980). In the 1982 election, $83 million was spent-an increase
of almost another 100%. FPPC, 1982 Campaign Costs Shatter Record. Press Release, (Feb.
25, 1983).
Expenditures per vote for gubernatorial elections in constant dollars increased from
$.28 in 1958 to $.42 in 1978. FPPC, Campaign Costs: How Much They Have Increased and
Why? supra, at 27. For State Senate elections, the cost per vote in constant dollars almost
quadrupled from $.09 in 1958 to $.35 in 1978. Id. The greatest increase took place in State
Assembly elections where expenditures went from $.10 to $.47. Id.
It is not clear why campaign expenditures in constant dollars have increased so sharply.
For an inconclusive analysis by the FPPC, see id. at 31-50. The FPPC did conclude that its
data provide "no support for the hypothesis that increasing competition is a factor underly-
ing increasing campaign costs." Id. at 38. There is no competitive contest in the over-
whelming majority of legislative districts. Better reporting may have been a factor, but
much of the increase has occurred since 1974 without any changes in the reporting regime.
Id. at 48-49.
Candidates are spending a substantially greater amount and proportion of their total
expenditures on mailings, especially particularized, computer-aided mailings. Id. at 46-48.
About one-third of the reported expenditures in 1978 were for postage. id. at 41, and postage
rates have increased faster than the rate of inflation generally. See infra note 51. The in-
crease in postage rates, however, would explain only a small part of the overall rise in ex-
penditures.
One important factor may be that more money has become available for campaign
finance. This could be because of increased wealth in the state, or perhaps because of the
increased role-real or perceived-of the government in the economy so that the stakes in
government decisions seem much greater. Candidates may also have become more system-
atic and proficient in raising contributions. If it appears that there is a chance to win an
election, large amounts of money often can be put into a campaign in its final stages with
little or no warning for opponents. This threat undoubtedly causes some seemingly safe
candidates to raise, and perhaps spend, large sums that otherwise they would not think nec-
essary. Even if a candidate does not need contributions received for his own campaign, the
money can be transferred to other candidates or used for various non-campaign purposes
that may be politically or otherwise advantageous to the candidate.
18. See generally the FPPC biennial reports of contributions received by candidates for
state offices in general and primary elections-e.g., FPPC, 1982 Legislative Winners: A Re-
port on Campaign Contributions of $100 or More Received During the Primary and General
Elections 1-523 (Aug. 1983); FPPC, Contributions Received by Statewide and State Officehold-
ers and Candidatesfrom Major Contributors, January 1, 1981, through June 30, 1982, at 2-248
(Oct. 1982).
Only eight percent of the contributions received by legislative winners in 1982 were
from sources contributing less than $100 to a candidate. FPPC, Legislative Leaders Top
Campaign Contribution List, Press Release 2 (Aug. 10, 1983). In the 1980 general election
nine percent of the contributions to legislative candidates came from those sources. FPPC,
Sources of Contributions to California State Legislative Candidatesfor the November 4, 1980
General Election 1 (Aug. 6, 1981).
Contributors of $5,000 or more gave $23.1 million to winners of legislative elections in
1982. FPPC, 1982 Legislative Winners, supra at ii-xxx. This sum amounted to two-thirds of
the total contributions of $34.8 million received by those winners. See FPPC, Legislative
Leaders Top Campaign Contribution Lists, supra, at 2. Twenty of the largest contributors
alone gave $5.9 million to legislative candidates in the 1982 election cycle. Common Cause,
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other business entities and related political action committees is great
and has grown substantially.19 Party contributions, in contrast, have
diminished and relatively are very small.2" A significant portion of
overall contributions is given initially to legislative leaders and other
strategically situated legislators, who then transfer large amounts to
other legislative candidates.2
Campaign contributions are given not only to elect candidates who
independently support contributors' interests but, in important part, to
gain special access to elected officials and to obtain favorable decisions
by them. Much of the money comes from those individuals or groups
with economic interests that they believe may be affected significantly
by the actions of officials receiving the contributions.22 Large amounts
Twenty Who Gave $16 Million: .4 Study of Money and Politics in California 1975-1982, at 69
(1983).
19. In the 1982 primary and general elections almost two-thirds of the amounts received
by winners of state legislative races in contributions of $100 or more came from businesses
and trade related organizations, including agriculture groups and health care providers.
FPPC, 1982 Legislative Winners, supra note 18, at vii, table I. By comparison labor organi-
zations provided only five percent of the amounts in contributions of $100 or more. Id.
Business and financial organizations made 45% of the reported "major donor" contri-
butions and independent expenditures in the 1976 general election. FPPC, Campaign Con-
tribution and Spending Report 258 (1977). This figure was 58% in 1980. FPPC, Campaign
Contribution and Expenditure Report for November 4, 1980 General Ekction (1981). Under
the California Political Reform Act, a "major donor" is a person, or group of persons, that
contributes $5,000 or more in a calendar year to California state and local elections. CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 82013(c) (West 1976 & Supp. 1983). If a person or group spends $500 or
more to influence voters, the person or group is deemed an "independent expenditure com-
mittee," which must publicly report the expenditures. Id. at § 84208.
It is also worth noting that much of the money-77% in the 1980 general election-
received by candidates for the legislature comes from business entities, political action com-
mittees, and other sources located outside the particular candidate's district. FPPC, Sources
of Contributions to California State Legislative Candidates, supra note 18, at 2.
20. The FPPC summaries for 1976 and 1980 show that political organizations made
nine percent of the major donor contributions and independent expenditures in the 1976
general election and three percent in the 1980 general election. FPPC, Campaign Contribu-
tions and Spending Report 25 (1976); FPPC, Campaign Contribution and Spending Report C-
31 (1980). In the 1982 elections, political parties contributed only 1.2% of the amount of
contributions in excess of $100 received by winners of legislative seats. FPPC, 1982 Legisla-
tive Winners, supra note 18, at vii, table I.
21. See FPPC, 1982 Legislative Wfinners, supra note 18, at vii, ii-xxx; FPPC, Legislative
Leaders Top Campaign Contribution List, supra note 18, at 1: "Chairman Dan Stanford ex-
plained the legislative leaders raise large amounts in contributions from such traditional
sources as business and labor and then transfer those funds to other candidates. . . . For
the 80 Assembly winners, transfers accounted for 20% of the identifiable contributions,
double the percentage of only two years earlier. For Senate winners, transfers represented
25% of their contributions of $100 or more, compared to a mere 4% in the 1980 General
Election." Id. at 1, 3.
22. According to Common Cause, 22 groups gave almost $8.5 million to candidates and
other contributing committees in the 1982 state elections. Common Cause, Biggest Contribu-
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of money in increased profits, lower taxes, higher government subsi-
dies, and other benefits are often at stake.23 To some extent, the inter-
ests of these contributors counter each other, but there is a gross
imbalance on many issues.24 Indeed, large givers, even business and
labor, often work together. Undoubtedly, there are substantial unjusti-
fiable costs to the public and to the natural environment because of
special interest influence from campaign contributions.25
Many contributions by "economic interests" are made without a
specific desire for, or expectation of, favorable treatment. Such contri-
butions may be given for past supportive decisions or because the con-
tributor approves of the candidate's stands apart from any direct
relation to the contributor's economic advantage. Moreover, contribu-
tions seeking favor may be needless or unsuccessful. In many cases,
officeholders do not give special treatment or, if they do, it is not be-
cause of campaign gifts. Nevertheless, contributions are deemed suffi-
ciently worthwhile that they are made in large and sharply increasing
amounts by those with financial stakes in government decisions. On
the whole these contributions are not given altruistically, but as "an
investment in ...economic well-being." 26  Indeed, candidates fre-
quently take advantage of concerns about government decisions to
pressure contributors to give substantial sums. There is a significant
amount of coercion by officeholders or likely officeholders in campaign
tors Gave $8.5 Million in 1982 Elections, Press Release (Nov. 10, 1982). Of these 22 contribu-
tors, I 1 were business organizations, six were unions, four were professional or trade
organizations, and one was an organization of gun owners. Among these top contributors
were: California Medical Political Action Committee (PAC), United Farm Workers PAC,
California State Employees Association, United for California (supported by major corpora-
tions), Association for Better Citizenship (California Teachers Association), California Real
Estate PAC, California Trial Lawyers PAC, Bankers Responsible Government Committee,
and Gun Owners of California. Id.
In 1982, the 60 largest organizational contributors, other than political parties, gave
almost $8.5 million to legislative winners alone. Approximately 45% of this amount came
from 33 business organizations, 25% from 11 labor groups, 13% from eight professional or-
ganizations, and 12% from four health groups. FPPC, 1982 Legislative Winners, supra note
18, at ii-v (1983).
23. See Common Cause, Twenty Who Gave $16 Million, supra note 18, at 54-61.
24. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, POWER AND LAND IN CALIFORNIA, ch. I, §§ HI-IV & ch.
VIII, § 1 (1971).
25. See Common Cause, Twenty Who Gave $16 million, supra note 18, at 53-6 1; See also
In Sacramento, Money Talks Louder than Voters, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 1, 1982, at
Part 1, p. A-6.
26. In Sacramento, Money Talks Louder than Voters, supra note 25, at Part 1, p. A-I.
Of course, many large contributers to candidates also spend substantial amounts for lobby-
ing, advertising, and public relations efforts to influence officeholders and the public regard-
ing government decisions.
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fundraising.27
Some candidates freely take money from special interests, even if
that entails commitments to the contributors. More significantly, can-
didates accept such contributions because they believe that the added
campaign expenditures thereby permitted materially increase their
chances of election.28 At a minimum, candidates or potential candi-
dates often conduct themselves to maintain their principal sources of
funds and to avoid a challenge well-financed by special interest
contributions.
Incumbents commonly raise and spend a great deal more money
than challengers.2 9 Economic interests regularly contribute to likely
winners, who are most often incumbents.30 Incumbents obtain many
contributions in the year or years preceding their re-election year.3'
This "off-year" fundraising is facilitated because measures important to
potential contributors are then pending before the legislature and other
governmental entities. Accumulating a substantial "war chest" before
27. "Lobbyists' office [sic] are being deluged with invitations . . .they all get the
message across; it's time to pony up...
"The written invitations often are followed up by personal telephone calls from legisla-
tors to lobbyists. If a lobbyist plans on dealing with that legislator he usually coughs up the
money-his client's money-or at least makes a favorable recommendation to the political
action committee his client maintains.
"Lobbyists, the public tends to believe, corrupt otherwise innocent legislatures by press-
ing money upon them. That doubtless occurs.
"But just as often it is the legislator who is putting the arm on the lobbyist for money, a
form of gentle extortion that implies that if the lobbyist doesn't come through, he can expect
unfriendly treatment in the future." Dan Walters, Sacramento Union (quoted in Common
Cause, Twenty Who Gave $16 Million, supra note 18, at 4).
28. The median winner in the 1982 State Senate general election outspent the median
major party loser by a ratio of 3.66 to 1; in the Assembly the ratio was 4.4 to 1. FPPC,
Campaign Receipts and Expenditures by State Candidates, November 2, 1,982 General Election
(Feb. 1983). In 1980 the figures were 8.4 to 1, and 5.3 to I, respectively. Id.
In those general election contests that the FPPC classifies as "competitive," the median
State Senate winner raised $296,393, as against the median major party loser's $247,733.
FPPC, The Impact of Campaign Contribution Limitations and Public Financing on Candidates
for the California State Legislature 144-165 (1983). In "competitive" Assembly races the
median winner raised $228,989, and the median major party loser $186,132. Id.
29. The median expenditure in the general election for the State Senate in 1982 was
$208,105 for incumbents and $35,494 for challengers. In 1980, the corresponding figures
were $109,205 and $12,732. For Assembly elections the median amount spent was $94,122
for incumbents and $10,705 for challengers in 1982, and $84,956 for incumbents and $10,108
for challengers in 1980. FPPC, Campaign Receipts and Expenditures by State Candidates,
supra note 28.
30. See FPPC, The California PAC Phenomenon 14-23 (May 1980); Common Cause,
Twenty Who Gave $16 million, supra note 18, at chs. 2 & 3.
31. See, e.g., FPPC, Contributions Received by Statewide and State Officeholders and
Candidates from Major Contributors, supra note 18, at 209-48.
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the date of filing for candidacy deters challengers and gives incumbents
advantage should a major contest develop. If the incumbent does not
need the money for his or her own re-election, it can be used to support
other candidates32 or for any other lawful purpose.
II. Objectives of Reforms
Major changes in campaign financing are needed in California.
These changes should reduce substantially the dependence of candi-
dates on large individual or group contributions and diminish the influ-
ence of major contributors with government officials. The ability of
affluent individuals, organizations, and economic interests to elect offi-
cials also needs to be materially lessened. Yet, at the same time, it is
important that there be enough money for adequate, forceful cam-
paigns by candidates who can show appreciable public support. There
needs to be more electoral competition. Necessary campaign funds
should be attainable with practical effort and be timely for effective use.
Citizen participation in politics needs to be increased. There
should be substantial incentives for candidates to solicit and for per-
sons to make modest campaign donations. Expenditure levels should
be high enough so that candidates will make significant expenditures
on person-to-person contact and other grassroots campaign activities.
As a vital means of citizen participation in government, political parties
ought to be strengthened by the campaign finance system, and at the
same time made more accessible, democratic, and effective through
other efforts.
To the extent that these objectives of campaign finance reform re-
quire inconsistent actions, priority should be given to reducing undue
influence from contributions, then to lessening the advantage furnished
by wealth in elections, and finally to providing adequate funds for cam-
paigns and strengthening citizen participation.
III. Possible Reforms
A. Disclosure of Campaign Finances
Extensive public disclosure of campaign finances is valuable for
32. During the 1980 general election, state officeholders and candidates transferred ap-
proximately $1.5 million to the campaigns of other candidates for the Legislature. FPPC,
Sources of Contributions to Caifornia State Legislative Candidates, supra note 18, at 2. By
1982, the amount increased to almost $3.5 million for winners of legislative seats alone.
FPPC, 1982 Legislative Winners, supra note 18, at vii. A large share of this money, however,
came from legislative leaders acting on behalf of the party caucus in their house. See supra
note 21.
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many reasons.33 It places constraints on the sources and amounts of
contributions, and perhaps even on the amount and nature of expendi-
tures. Disclosure deters favoritism to contributors in situations where
contributions might be perceived to influence official actions. Pre-elec-
tion reporting especially provides voters with relevant information
about a candidate's supporters and positions. In general, disclosure has
increased knowledge about campaign financing and has provided the
basis for further reforms.34
On the negative side, disclosure disregards contributors' desires for
privacy in their political activity. It undoubtedly deters some innocu-
ous donations because of persons' actual or feared vulnerability to ad-
verse reactions or because of their dislike of publicity. Disclosure thus
may aggravate the shortage of campaign financing, especially for can-
didates opposed by incumbents or interests capable of extensive retalia-
tion. Record keeping and reporting requirements also add to the cost
of campaigns.
It is unclear whether significant and desirable changes can be
made in California's disclosure requirements. "Closing dates" for cer-
tain reports could be moved nearer to elections.35 In legislative races,
contributions of $500 or more, instead of the present $1000, received
after the final pre-election closing date probably should be reported by
telegram or personal delivery within forty-eight hours of receipt.36
33. See generally John F. Kennedy School of Government, Institute of Politics, An
Analysis of the Impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 1972-1978, at 1-1, 1-24, 1-25
(1979).
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) the Supreme Court held that the broad
disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act were valid as generally ap-
plied. The Court noted that minor parties' First Amendment rights might be violated if they
could show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors'
names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties." Id. at 74.
The Court then ruled in Brown v. Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S.
87, 88, 100 (1982) that a state could not constitutionally require disclosure by the Socialist
Workers Party of the names of campaign contributors or recipients of expenditures when the
party "historically has been the object of harassment by government officials and private
parties, [and] the evidence . . . establishes a reasonable probability that disclosing the
names of [the party's] contributors and recipients will subject them to threats, harassment,
and reprisals." Id at 423-24.
34. See generally FPPC, The Impact of Campaign Contribution Limitations and Public
Financing, supra note 28.
35. The first pre-election report for primary elections could be due approximately six
weeks before the primary rather than the present ten weeks. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84200
(West 1976 & Supp. 1983). The closing date for the final pre-election report for both pri-
mary and general elections might be 14 days before voting with three days to file, rather
than the current 17 days and five days to fie. Id. at §§ 84200(b) & 84202.
36. See id. at §§ 84207(a), 82306 (West 1976 & Supp. 1984).
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These changes would produce more timely information, though the ef-
fect probably would not be important in most cases, and the final pre-
election report would be somewhat less useful. Modest improvements
in disclosure probably could be realized by additional enforcement ef-
forts and by imposition of stiffer penalties.
There may be advantages in cutting back on the required content
of disclosure reports." Even though record keeping requirements con-
tinue, a reduction in report content would diminish the burden on cam-
paigns. Possibly only contributions of $200 or more, rather than $100,
should have to be disclosed in detail (i.e., contributors' names, ad-
dresses, amounts, and occupations, and the names of their employers or
businesses).38 Less information also might be required on expendi-
tures, with a substantially higher threshold for particularized report-
ing. 9 With less disclosure, possibly greater use would be made of
significant information in reports.
A major problem with campaign finance disclosure is the mean-
ingful dissemination of information in reports to potential voters. Pri-
mary reliance for publication must rest on opposing candidates, who
often lack the necessary means or incentive, particularly given their
own campaign finance sources. Prior to elections, the FPPC now pub-
lishes receipt and expenditure totals for candidates, and a list of the
largest contributors to each candidate.1° Through modem information
technology, the FPPC probably could provide additional analyses and
summaries. For example, FPPC reports might publish the names of all
substantial contributors to each candidate and the amount of their con-
tributions, the industries or occupations of the contributors, and to the
extent practicable, aggregate contributions to each candidate from dif-
ferent industries and occupations. Although the information would be
helpful to voters, certain of these analyses would be difficult or impossi-
ble to do thoroughly and accurately in the short time before elections.
The analyses and summaries also might be subject to controversy, and
could constitute a dangerous interference by government in elections.
Unfortunately, there is relatively little media publication or broad-
cast of campaign finance information. The FPPC should mail summa-
ries and analyses, in a readily usable form, at the earliest practicable
time to newspapers and broadcasters. The First Amendment appar-
ently prohibits the government from compelling newspaper publica-
37. See id. at § 84211.
38. Id. at § 84211(f).
39. See id. at § 84211).
40. See supra note 16.
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tion, with or without compensation. 41 Although the constitutional
barriers are less for broadcast media,42 any required dissemination of
campaign finance information over the airwaves would have to be im-
posed by the federal government because it has preempted broadcast
regulation.43 Government funds to pay for voluntary publication or
broadcast undoubtedly would be very limited. In any event, in media
markets with large populations only the most limited space or time or-
dinarily could be given to the dissemination of campaign finance infor-
mation relating to each of the scores of candidates seeking office.' It
does not seem practical to mail information to all registered voters,
even as part of the ballot pamphlet. Finally, if there were greater dis-
semination of campaign finance information, it is not clear how much
attention and weight the public would give the information in view of
the many factors affecting voting and other political activity.
B. Limitations on Contributions
The most obvious and direct way to restrict special influence and
access because of large contributions, and more generally to curtail the
advantage of wealth in elections, is to impose limits on the amount a
contributor or class of contributors can give to a candidate. Substantial
restrictions on contributions may be imposed constitutionally under the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo .45 Moreover, contribu-
41. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
42. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
43. See KVUE, Inc. v. Austin Broadcasting Corp., 709 F.2d 922, 931-37 (5th Cir. 1983).
44. In the San Francisco Bay Area media market, for example, there are at least 20
Assembly and 10 State Senate seats, as well as contests for statewide offices, the United
States Congress, and a multitude of local offices. Space and time problems would be even
more acute in primaries because of the still larger number of candidates.
45. "[A] limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute...
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communi-
cation.... The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase percepti-
bly with the size of his contribution . . . . While contributions may result in political
expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, .. [that]
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.
"It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose--to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions-in order
to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation [in the
FECA] ....
• . . [W]hile the contribution limitation provisions might well have been structured to
take account of the graduated expenditure limitations for congressional and Presidential
campaigns, Congress' failure to engage in such fine tuning does not invalidate the legisla-
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tion limits seemingly have a great deal of public support,46 and proba-
bly would increase public confidence in the political system and
government.
L Level of Contribution Limits
Given the large amounts raised and spent in campaigns, contribu-
tion limits could be set relatively high without significant risk of undue
influence from any single gift. 47 A critical problem with high limits,
however, is cumulative contributions from an interest group or related
interest groups. A large corporation may have many executives, an in-
dustry dozens of firms and connected businesses, or a profession
thousands of members who can make donations. To a significant ex-
tent, these contributions can be programmed and coordinated, even to
the point of being delivered jointly.48 But regardless of how and when
the contributions are made, they come from persons with common in-
terests, at least as frequently perceived by officeholders.
Accordingly, contribution limits need to be set relatively low to
prevent excessive influence from cumulative gifts. An alternative
would be to impose a ceiling on the aggregate amount that candidates
could receive in contributions of more than a modest sum. This alter-
native would give candidates flexibility to raise some money in large
tion... . [A] court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as
well as $1,000." 424 US. at 20-21, 26-27, 30 (footnotes omitted).
The Court went on to note, however, that "the Act's $1,000 contribution limitation...
[leaves] persons free ... to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in support-
ing candidates and committees with financial resources. Significantly. the Act's contribution
limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust
and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues ...
"Absent record evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a
court should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes even-
handed restrictions ...
"[T]he record provides no basis for concluding that the Act invidiously disadvantages
[minor party and independent candidates]." 424 U.S. 28-29, 31, 33. (footnotes omitted).
46. According to Thomas K. Houston, former chairman of the FPPC, a poll found that
90% of California voters would support a measure which imposed contribution and spend-
ing limits, and required fair campaign practices. Campaign Spending Is Issue on Coast, N.
Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984.
47. Except for voluntary services, "contributions" should be defined to encompass
things of value given to a candidate or other person, or expended subject to the direction of
or in concert with the candidate or person, to effect the outcome of an election. Cf. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 82015 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983).
48. There should be broad "attribution" provisions treating contributions by parent cor-
porations, subsidiaries, divisions, or persons subject to the control of another as coming from
a single source. Nevertheless, the problem of cumulative contribution would still remain.
For a case study, see Common Cause, Disturbing Developments: A Study of the San Diego
City Council Elections of 1983 (1984).
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sums, but because of the aggregate limits many candidates would have
greater freedom to accept or reject larger contributions, thereby reduc-
ing the leverage of particular gifts or potential gifts.49
The problem with low contribution limits is the need for substan-
tial campaign funds. Absent extraordinary volunteer efforts, it neces-
sarily costs a great deal to communicate with potential voters in
California's highly populated legislative districts, let alone for state-
wide offices.50 There is multifarious competition for the public's atten-
tion, and elections for public office-particularly for legislative and
lesser statewide offices--seemingly do not rank very high among most
persons' attention priorities. Media rates are expensive, especially in
the many election disfricts that constitute only a small part of a media
market. To communicate with constituents by mass media in these dis-
tricts, a candidate must pay large sums for an audience primarily
outside the district. The cost of mailings, the principal alternative to
mass media communication, has been rising faster than the price level
generally.51
If contribution limits materially restrict available campaign funds,
they can preclude adequate communication by candidates with poten-
tial voters. As one study concluded, "[1]imited campaign funds often
mean limited campaign activity, which, in turn, means a poorly in-
formed and apathetic electorate." 2 In many instances, limited funds
49. Candidate demand for private contributions might be mitigated in other ways; for
example, by low spending limits, or substantial public treasury financing for campaigns.
50. For example, there often may be 100,000 or more households in an Assembly dis-
trict. It costs approximately 18 to 20 cents to prepare and mail a campaign message to each
of those households. Thus, a single mailing to all households in the district costs approxi-
mately $20,000. Three or more of these general mailings are often thought to be the mini-
mum necessary for an effective campaign. Numerous special mailings to selected groups are
also desirable. A substantial television and radio campaign can easily cost $75,000 or more,
even in a district that lies within a single broadcast media market. In larger media markets
the expense may become prohibitive. There are also substantial overhead costs for a cam-
paign. Accordingly, expenditures of $150,000 to $200,000 can reasonably be made during an
Assembly general election campaign. State Senate districts, which are twice as large, are
even more expensive, although not proportionately so.
51. During the period from 1948-1982, first class postage rates increased 400% (from 4
cents per ounce to 20 cents), and bulk rates increased 445% (from 2 cents per piece to 10.9
cents). For the same period, the California consumer price index rose 246.1%. See FPPC,
Campaign Costsfor the Caiffornia State Legislature, 1958 through 1982, at 2 (1983).
Mail has become an increasingly important means for candidate communication with
potential voters: "In 1958, payments for campaign literature, including postage, accounted
for between one-fourth and one-third of all expenditures; by 1978, payments for campaign
literature accounted for approximately one-half of all expenditures." See FPPC, Campaign
Costs.- How Much Have They Increased and WhyZ supra note 17, at 45-46. See also John F.
Kennedy School of Government, supra note 33, at 1-15 (1979).
52. John F. Kennedy School of Government, supra note 33, at 1-17.
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would preclude serious competition. This lack of competition is com-
pounded whenever one of the candidates for an office is an incumbent
or otherwise well-known, especially when that candidate has a far
greater ability to raise money within the contribution limits from a
large number of contributors.
Contribution limits, therefore, must be fixed with regard to the
campaign funds that need to be raised, as well as to the prevention of
undue influence. Strict limits probably would increase the number of
contributors by forcing candidates to solicit more widely, by making
more persons feel that modest contributions are worth giving, and by
enhancing respect for the electoral process generally. But even with
intense, imaginative fundraising efforts, many campaigns would be
handicapped severely by low limits if there were no substantial alterna-
tive sources of funds. Indeed, unavailability of large contributions
would preclude some candidates from raising the sums necessary to
cover the relatively high initial investment for extensive solicitation of
small contributions. A special, higher contribution limit probably is
needed for an appropriate amount of "start-up" funds to make possible
substantial campaigns by lesser known candidates.5"
Given the high stakes in elections, contribution limits frequently
would be violated if they did not provide for needed campaign funds
and there were no adequate alternative sources. These violations
would occur despite explicit prohibitions on the use of intermediaries,
restrictions on cash or anonymous contributions, and even strong en-
forcement efforts. Moreover, contribution limits can be circumvented
by "independent expenditures" made on behalf of a candidate. The
Supreme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that these expenditures gener-
ally cannot be prohibited or limited if they are not subject to the candi-
date's control or made in concert with her.54 Truly independent
expenditures are often not as effective as those made by the candidate,
but in many instances they can be significant. The names and interests
of contributors to independent efforts often are known or available to
53. To illustrate, a candidate for the legislature might be permitted to raise $30,000 or
$40,000 in contributions in excess of the contribution limit during a primary or general elec-
tion campaign.
54. 424 U.S. at 39-51. In Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982), however, an
equally divided Court affirmed the district court decision, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
invalidating limits on independent expenditures on behalf of a Presidential candidate receiv-
ing government payment of his campaign expenses. The Schmitt case may indicate greater
openness by the Court toward restrictions on independent expenditures. In this respect, the
Court in Buckley qualified its position by observing that "the independent advocacy re-
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officeholders whom they help elect, with the consequent possibility of
special access or influence.
2 Organizational Contributions
A number of states have laws prohibiting corporation or labor
union contributions to political campaigns.55 The Supreme Court has
recently indicated that existing broad prohibitions on corporate and
union expenditures and contributions in federal elections are constitu-
tional.56 If there are limits on organizational contributions generally,
however, a ban on corporate or labor contributions does not seem nec-
essary. In states where these prohibitions are in effect, they are often
evaded by organizationally arranged or inspired gifts directly from in-
dividual officers or employers, or by contributions from "voluntary
funds" collected from donations by employees or members, and dis-
tributed by corporate or union officials.57 Any efforts to impose a ban
on corporate or union contributions would produce potent opposition
in the California legislature from those organizations.
It seems improper to fix limits for organizations with many mem-
bers or contributors at the same levels as limits for individuals, espe-
cially if the members or contributors do not have the incentive or
convenient opportunity to make contributions directly to candidates.
Again, higher contribution limits for these organizations may be neces-
sary politically to enact campaign finance reforms. Organizational him-
stricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent cor-
ruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions." 424 U.S. at 46.
Apparently prohibition of independent expenditures by corporations and labor unions
is valid under the Court's reasoning in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982). See infra note 56.
Although independent expenditures generally cannot be prohibited, they can be nar-
rowly defined. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 46-47, particularly n.53. See generally
Note, Campaign Finance Re-Reforz The Regulation afIndeendent Political Committees, 71
CALIF. L. REv. 673 (1983).
55. See supra note 3.
56. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm. 459 U.S. 197 (1982),
and the cases discussed therein. NationalRight to Work involved application of the general
prohibition on corporate expenditures in federal elections to expenditures made by a non-
profit corporation to solicit contributions for a political fund established and administered
by the corporation. The Court held that the prohibition applied to nonprofit corporations
and that it was constitutional. The majority declared that the various restrictions imposed
by Congress on corporate and union expenditures and contributions were "to account for
the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor unions," and that
under the federal Constitution these restrictions are "a permissible assessment of the dangers
posed by those entities to the electoral process." Id. at 209.
57. D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY 51-52 (1975); H. ALEXANDER, Fi-
NANCING POLITics 71-72 (2d. ed. 1980).
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its, therefore, should be fixed at modest levels with very broad
gradations reflecting the number of organization members or contribu-
tors. Perhaps larger contributions should be permitted only from a
fund composed of small contributions to the organization, for example
fifty dollars or less. A different approach to organizational contribu-
tions would be to have relatively high limits-or no limits-on contri-
butions to a candidate from a single organization, but reasonable limits
on the aggregate gifts to a candidate from all organizations.
58
Political parties should be strengthened by making their contribu-
tion limits much higher than the limits for other organizations.59 Par-
ties can perform very valuable functions by forming coalitions,
selecting candidates, organizing government, and holding elected offi-
58. See, e.g., the proposed Obey-Railsback Amendment to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, H.R. 4970, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H6762 (1979).
The constitutionality of an aggregate limit on contributions from organizations or other
sources is uncertain. The Court in Buckley stated that there are protected interests in mak-
ing a contribution to a candidate: "The Act's contribution.., limitations... impinge on
protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution . . . serves to affiliate a person
with a candidate. . . . A limitation on the amount of money a person may give. . . [still]
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution. . . ." 424 U.S. at
21, 22. An aggregate limit on contributions from organizations prohibits an organization
from making any contribution once the ceiling is reached, and therefore may be an unconsti-
tutional infringement on the organization's right of political association.
The Court in Buckley did hold that Congress could impose a cumulative limit ($25,000)
on the amount that an individual could contribute to all candidates for federal office in a
calendar year. Id. at 38. This limit might be considered analogous to an aggregate limit on
contributions to a candidate in that both limits would prevent a contribution to a candidate
once the maximum was reached. The cumulative limit on contributors approved in Buckley,
however, allows a contributor to choose which candidates will receive contributions. The
aggregate limit on candidate receipts, on the other hand, deprives a potential contributor of
this choice once the candidate's ceiling is reached.
59. There is some question under the analysis in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 26-27,
and Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 294-99, whether limits on
party contributions to candidates in general elections are constitutional where the party is
not just acting as a conduit or agent for the contributor to the party. Buckley justified limita-
tions on contributions or expenditures only on the basis of preventing improper influence or
the appearance of improper influence. In Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 290, the
court reiterated, "Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on
political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception related to the per-
ception of undue influence of large contributors to candidates ... " d. at 296-97.
It is not clear whether there would be a significant risk of undue influence, or the ap-
pearance of undue influence, in favor of contributors to the party because of party contribu-
tions to candidates. Party influence with officeholders as a result of party contributions, on
the other hand, seems to raise very different constitutional issues. The party probably would
not be perceived as a person or interest group seeking improper influence in the sense of
narrow private advantage. Contributions by a party in the primary to candidates seeking
the party's nomination also should require different analysis. See supra note 7, and the cases
cited therein.
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cials accountable. 60 Parties themselves are subject to the electorate in
ways that differ from other organizations. If parties were allowed to
make large contributions, that would give them an important role, help
them to attract and keep able participants, and provide party activists
with greater influence over officeholders.
Besides strengthening parties, higher limits on contributions by
parties could indirectly reduce the influence of contributors. Party con-
tributions often could not be traced to a particular source, or at least
the recipient candidate would not attribute them to any particular
source. Earmarking of contributions to parties for specific candidates
should be prohibited, although enforcement would be difficult. To fur-
ther guard against improper influence, party contributions to candi-
dates could be restricted to a fund made up exclusively of relatively
small contributions. Parties should be able to accept large or unlimited
gifts for other purposes, including voter registration and get-out-the-
vote drives.
3. Candidate's Use of Personal Resources
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held that limits on a candidate's use
of his or her own money or property are unconstitutional, except as a
condition on receipt of government payments for campaign expenses.6"
As a consequence, wealthy candidates can freely spend large amounts
of personal funds on their own campaigns, even if their opponents are
subject to restrictive contribution limits. This unfair advantage can be
obviated if contribution limits are suspended for a candidate's oppo-
nents to the extent that the candidate uses his or her own funds in ex-
cess of a specified sum. Advance notice of excess expenditures could be
required so that opponents have a fair opportunity to obtain larger
contributions.62
60. See generally V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 199-227 (5th
ed. 1964).
61. 424 U.S. at 51-54, 57 n.65.
62. Required notice for "excess" spending of personal funds raises constitutional ques-
tions. There is no risk of improper influence or the appearance of improper influence by
contributors with the candidate. See supra note 59. The Court in Buckley explicitly rejected
"equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective office" as a
justification for expenditure or contribution limits. id. at 54.
Limited advance notice, however, is generally much less of a restriction than prohibi-
tions or limitations on expenditures or contributions. The courts probably would deem this
notice requirement constitutional because it would give opponents a fairer chance to com-
pete against a wealthy candidate while maintaining basically equitable limits on the
opponents.
584 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:567
C. Government Financing of Campaigns
Substantial new sources of campaign funds are needed in Califor-
nia, especially if significant restrictions are imposed on the size of pri-
vate contributions.
L Tax Benefts for Contributions
Government now finances campaigns in California through fed-
eral and state tax credits and deductions, and through incumbent use of
public employees and property for campaign purposes. Under federal
law, an individual taxpayer may receive a credit against income tax
equal to fifty percent of the amounts contributed for the nomination or
election of candidates for public office. 63 The maximum credit each
year is fifty dollars.' 4 California law provides that a taxpayer may de-
duct a maximum of $100 in political contributions each year in calcu-
lating taxable income. 65  By reducing contributors' taxes, the
government indirectly makes payments to candidates, with the alloca-
tion of the public funds being determined by the taxpayer contributors.
Tax benefits to contributors provide public treasury financing with
minimum government involvement in campaigns. Tax benefits pro-
voke the least opposition from officeholders and the public. 66 They
encourage candidates to solicit modest contributions and provide con-
tributors with incentives to make contributions. These benefits could
be liberalized to secure more campaign funds; for example, California
might authorize a state tax credit, or the federal government could raise
its tax credit to seventy-five percent of the amount contributed up to a
maximum of $100 per taxpayer.67
Tax benefits for campaign contributions do have serious draw-
backs, however. They use the tax system for purposes other than gov-
ernment revenue. They discriminate against those who have no
taxable income-a substantial portion of the adult population. Non-
taxpayers could be reimbursed for their contributions, but that does not
63. 26 U.S.C. § 41(a) (1976).
64. 26 U.S.C. § 41(b)(1) (1976).
65. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 17245 (West 1983).
66. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, PUBLIC FINANCING OF CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGNS 35-38 (1978); Wertheimer, Toward Consensus, COMMON CAUSE MAGAZINE 40-
41 (Nov./Dec. 1983).
67. Alaska, which has no income tax, provides a 100% refund of campaign contribu-
tions up to $100. ALASKA STAT. § 43 (1980). See H. ALEXANDER & J. FRUTIG supra note 1,
at 277-78. When combined with the federal tax credit, the Alaska refund means that a
contributor could receive $3 in tax reduction and payments from government for each $2
contributed up to $50.
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seem practical.68 Tax deductions, in contrast to credits, provide smaller
tax savings to lower bracket taxpayers or no tax savings to individuals
who do not itemize deductions.
It is uncertain to what extent tax benefits increase contributions or
would increase them if the benefits were greater. For many individu-
als, a partial paper credit or deduction, up to more than a year after an
out-of-pocket donation, does not provide much incentive to make con-
tributions. In large part, these tax benefits may simply subsidize contri-
butions that would have been made anyway.69 This situation may
change as the tax benefits are exploited more effectively by candidates
and become more widely understood by taxpayers.
A further problem with tax benefits, as generally conceived, is that
they provide no government control over allocation of the public subsi-
dies involved. There is no statutory limit on the amount of tax-subsi-
dized contributions that can be received by a candidate, nor any
minimum that is reasonably assured. Some candidates will receive
large amounts of these contributions, in particular those candidates
with high name recognition, ample finances to solicit modest contribu-
tions, or the support of powerful causes or organizations. In contrast,
other candidates will receive relatively little from tax-benefit contribu-
tions despite the candidates' need and potential support. Furthermore,
there is no public control over use of the contributions, including use
for non-campaign purposes. 70 In sum, existing and commonly pro-
posed tax benefits for contributions can be regarded as a striking exam-
ple of improperly "throwing public money at a problem."
2 Payments Dfrectly by the Government
Direct funding of campaign expenditures from the public treasury
is a superior alternative to the present methods of financing campaigns.
These public funds should be provided in sufficient, timely amounts so
68. But see supra note 67.
69. See D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 57, at 126-28.
70. Conceivably, segregation of tax benefit contributions could be required and limita-
tions could be imposed on the aggregate amount of those contributions that each candidate
could receive and on the use of the funds. There would be serious problems in enforcing
these limitations. Often, a contributor would not know whether a contribution qualified for
tax benefit or not, but would nevertheless claim the credit or deduction. A possible solution
would be to require the contributor to show written verification from the candidate that the
contribution came within the candidate's limit. Knowing falsification by the candidate in
making this verification could be a crime. Enforcement of the verification requirement
against contributors, however, would burden tax administration and, to a degree, reduce the
tax incentive to make contributions. See H.R. 4428, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Cf. H.
ALEXANDER, TAX INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 37-62 (1961).
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that most candidates for state elective offices with potential extensive
support can finance a substantial campaign. Modest private contribu-
tions also ought to be allowed because they are an important form of
citizen participation in elections. The system, accordingly, should be
one of mixed public-private financing.
Supporters of direct public financing of campaigns anticipate that
it would produce more representative and fairer government, greater
access to public office for those without personal wealth or wealthy
backers, and better informed citizen participation in elections. 71 They
believe that the hard, "dollars-and-cents" savings for most of the public
from reducing special interest influence will greatly exceed the cost of
government payments; that tax loopholes will be reduced, subsidies
abated, and costs to consumers from unjustifiable governmental inter-
ference in the private market lessened.72
Apart from opposition for reasons of partisan or incumbent ad-
vantage, or continued special interest influence, public financing is op-
posed because of its cost and a belief that other uses of the funds are
more valuable. Public financing of primary and general elections for
statewide and legislative offices probably would cost in the range of
$25-$35 million per year in current dollars over a four-year election
cycle.73 Although this amount is an appreciable sum, it represents only
approximately one-tenth of one percent of the state budget, or about
one dollar per year for each Californian.
There might be further objection to public financing on the ground
it violates citizens' political freedom. Taxes should not be used, it may
be argued, to support candidates that a taxpayer opposes or does not
favor. Analogy has been made to the use of taxes to support religion.74
71. See, e.g., Common Cause, Twenty Who Gave $16 Million, supra note 18, at 75-78.
72. "[P]roponents claim that the true costs of the present system are dramatically under-
stated because ... of the many subsidies special interest groups receive from [legislators]
who have been favored with their contributions. This, or at least a large part of it, will cease
once public funding is adopted .... Under the present system the general populace pays
an excessively high price in distorted public policy decisions .... ." AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE INSTITUTE, PUBLIC FINANCING OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 23 (1978).
73. See Common Cause, Costs of A.B. 12, Press Release (June 22, 1983) (calculations
averaging from $14.7-31.5 million per year for legislative races only): FPPC, The Impact of
Campaign Contribution Limits and Public Financing, supra note 28, at 138-140 (estimate of
nine million dollars per year for legislative general elections only). Public funding of cam-
paigns for statewide elections for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treas-
urer, Controller, and Superintendent of Public Institution seemingly would average four to
seven million dollars per year.
74. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Polsby, Buck-
ley v. Valeo, The Special Nature ofolitical Speech, 1 Sup. CT. REv. 31-35 (1976).
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The separation of church and state, however, is expressly mandated by
federal and state constitutions.
Eligible voters, as well as citizens generally, have an interest in
substantial, informative campaigns in choosing officeholders." They
also have an important stake in government officials--even those they
oppose-being free from the influence of campaign contributions.76
Seemingly, there is a general interest, too, in a fair election process that
does not discriminate materially among citizens on the basis of wealth
or access to wealth, and that increases public confidence and participa-
tion in government.
3. Government Funding and Political Parties
One of the most troubling aspects of public financing of campaigns
is the role of political parties. A forceful argument can be made that
direct public financing of candidates will cause greater fragmentation,
incoherence and ineffectiveness in government by further reducing par-
ties' influence over officeholders and candidates; 77 that public funding
ought to be through parties; and that the parties should have broad
discretion in deciding for which candidate the public funds are to be
spent and how the money is to be used. In a number of nations with a
parliamentary form of government, public financing of campaigns is
through political parties.78 More relevant, and much more surprising,
is that party control is the rule in several states in this country which
provide for government funding.7 9 Subject to some restrictions, party
organizations in those states determine how the funds are allocated
among candidates and party activities.
At the present time, however, party control over public treasury
campaign funds does not seem feasible in California. It would not be
considered seriously by the legislature or by campaign finance reform
75. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
76. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
77. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 72, at 26: "[Any form of gov-
ermnent subsidy which is given directly to candidates rather than to political party organiza-
tions inevitably will reduce the candidates' dependence upon the parties. This weakening
bond will tend to undercut whatever party cohesiveness and discipline there is, producing a
more atomized and fragmented political system, with still weaker political parties... mak-
ing it harder to hold public officials accountable. Weakened party ties also will affect public
policy by making it more difficult to mobilize majorities in legislative bodies." See also
Comments by H. Alexander, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SYMPOSIUM ON CAMPAIGN Fi-
NANCrNG REGULATION 39-40 (1975).
78. See D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 57, at ch. 9.
79. H. ALEXANDER & J. FRUTIG, supra note 1, at 14. The states that fund campaigns
through parties are Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, Rhode Island and Utah.
Id. The amounts involved have been small.
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groups. The state's tradition is too candidate-oriented. There appears
to be scant support for using parties to structure the election process
and little understanding of the important constructive role that they
can perform in a democratic system of government. Since parties in
California are now hardly more than empty shells, direct public financ-
ing of candidates would not actually weaken the parties much further.
Political parties in California need to be changed if they are to
control public campaign funds, as well as perform other important
functions. The California Election Code mandates that the statewide
governing bodies of parties be composed largely of legislators, defeated
candidates for the legislature, and those persons' appointees.80 At the
local level, the Code requires that county central committees be elected
by primary election voters.8 Because significant campaigns for these
committees are impractical in larger counties, incumbents are almost
automatically re-elected, and new members are chosen on arbitrary ba-
ses. Consistent with the Code, there is little relationship between state
and local party bodies-and certainly no hierarchy of party structures
built democratically on an open, activist grassroots base. Legislators
have been unwilling to give up their dominance and permit the parties
to be significant independent centers of strength to which the legislators
themselves might be accountable.
Much of the legislation restricting political parties is now being
challenged on constitutional freedom of speech and association
grounds.82 If successful, these challenges would permit the parties, sub-
ject to basic rights of access and procedural safeguards, to organize and
govern themselves.
4. Candidate Eligibility and Bases for Public Payments
Public monies used for campaign expenses should be appropriated
from the state's general fund. The total public payments should not be
fixed, as they are under the federal law for presidential campaigns,83 by
the number of taxpayers who designate on their income tax forms that
they wish to have a specified amount of their taxes used to finance cam-
80. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 8660, 9160 (West Supp. 1983).
81. Id. at §§ 8820-8823.5, 9320-9323.
82. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Abrams v. Reno, 452 F. Supp.
1166 (S.D. Fla. 1978), af'd, 649 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
A recent case in the United States District Court, Northern District of California, San Fran-
cisco County Democratic Central Comm. v. Eu, No. C-83-5599-MHP, appeal docketed, No.
84-1851 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 1984), held that California statutes prescribing party organizations
and certain procedures, and prohibiting party organization primary endorsements were
unconstitutional.
83. 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (1976).
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paigns. Unfortunately, this "checkoff" system has been copied in a
number of states that have public financing of campaigns or political
parties. 4 The tax checkoff seems inconsistent with majoritarian and
representative government because it permits individual taxpayers to
determine the amount of government funds that are available for cam-
paign financing. It is a gimmick that provides no additional revenue;
the money must still come from general treasury funds. Like tax bene-
fits for contributors, the checkoff system discriminates against non-tax-
payers, who are excluded from participation. The total checked may
be substantially less than the full public payments that candidates need
and otherwise are entitled to under the law.' Legislative appropria-
tion in excess of the amounts checked seems unlikely; repeal of the
checkoff system once established would be very difficult. If only part of
the public payments are available, contribution limits based upon full
payments would seriously prejudice some candidates, especially
challengers.
Public financing is important in primaries as well as in general
elections; indeed, the need for public financing is probably greater in
primaries. Candidates are more numerous, and generally not as well
known as the candidates in a general election. Name recognition is
often expensive to secure. Frequently, primary candidates must strive
harder to obtain campaign contributions, and therefore are more vul-
nerable to "strings" attached to contributions. They do not have the
benefit of party loyalty in fundraising or the political support that fol-
lows simply from being designated the sole party representative on the
ballot. With the overwhelming majority of legislative districts in Cali-
fornia now "one party" districts (either naturally or by incumbent ger-
rymandering), primary elections may offer the only realistic possibility
for electoral competition in many districts.8 6 Those interested in influ-
84. H. ALEXANDER & J. FRUTIG, supra note 1, at 15-24.
It should be noted that a few states have enacted provisions permitting a taxpayer to
make a campaign contribution in connection with his tax return to a fund for candidates or
parties. These provisions are distinguishable from the checkoff system because the contribu-
tion is in addition to taxes; the tax return is simply the means by which the voluntary contri-
bution is made. Thus far, however, taxpayers have made little use of these provisions. Id. at
7.
85. See generally, Noragon, Political Finance and Political Reform: The Experience with
State Income Tax Checkoffs, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 667 (1981).
86. Given the great advantages of incumbents in primary elections, serious competition
normally would occur only when the incumbent was not seeking re-election.
One of the ironies of gerrymandering is that the problems of campaign financing are
reduced, in many cases, in districts dominated by one party. With no prospect of election,
candidates of the subordinate party will make minimal effort or have little success in raising
campaign funds. Nominees of the dominant party have no need to raise much money. But
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encing the outcome of elections and in receiving favorable treatment
from officeholders are likely to place an increasing share of their contri-
butions in competitive primaries.
Public payment of primary campaign expenses probably would
double the cost to the public treasury of funding campaigns, even if
maximum payments to individual candidates were substantially less
than in general elections. Because of the costs involved and the desira-
bility of limiting the number of substantial candidates for a nomina-
tion, questions of candidate eligibility for public funds in primaries are
critical.
In order to be eligible for public funds in any election, a candidate
should meet the requirements to be listed on the ballot. Since these
requirements are usually easy to satisfy in primaries, a candidate
should also be required to show appreciable public support. This sup-
port could be demonstrated by receipt of a prescribed minimum
amount of contributions, preferably in modest sums from individuals,
or, to permit participation by those who cannot afford contributions,
possibly by signed endorsements from registered voters in the election
district, or by a combination of contributions and signatures.8 7 Above
a fixed minimum amount, the support requirement should be adjusted
according to the number of voters in the district registered in the candi-
date's party, up to a reasonable maximum. Overall, eligibility require-
ments should be strict enough so that normally no more than two or
three candidates are able to qualify for public financing in each party
primary.
For general elections, party or independent nomination alone
probably should be enough to make a candidate eligible for public fi-
nancing. But arguably eligibility requirements should depend further
on the amount of public payments that a candidate receives simply by
becoming eligible, and on the criteria used for subsequent payments.
If, for example, public grants are limited solely to matching private
contributions at a low ratio,"8 then no significant further eligibility re-
quirements need to be imposed. 9 But if large payments are made on
see supra note 17. Of course, gerrymandering otherwise exacerbates problems of electoral
competition, accountability, and citizen participation.
87. A problem with signatures, either as a basis for eligibility or for subsequent pay-
ments, is that they may be given too freely, since they cost signers very little but have mone-
tary value for candidates. They also involve substantial verification burdens, especially if
registered voters may sign for only one candidate per nomination or office.
88. This type of system is used for federal presidential primary elections and caucuses.
26 U.S.C. § 9034 (Supp. 1983).
89. Candidates could be required, however, to present a minimum amount of matcha-
ble contributions at any one time to limit administrative cost and inconvenience.
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eligibility, candidates might be required to obtain a specified minimum
amount of contributions or number of signatures in order to avoid pay-
ments to nominees with no prospects of appreciable support.
Public payments in general elections might be patterned after the
system used in presidential elections. Upon nomination, major party
presidential nominees are immediately paid the maximum total
amount of government funds that they can receive for the election.90
Minor party or independent nominees receive a portion of that same
maximum based on their party or personal vote in the most recent pres-
idential election.9' An alternative to the presidential system would be
to pay all candidates a substantial part, perhaps twenty-five or thirty-
three percent, of their maximum payments on nomination. Candidates
would be entitled to the remainder of their public funds based on
matching of modest private contributions and, again, possibly signed
endorsements. The initial grant would facilitate a well-organized, ef-
fective campaign and would reduce the fundraising burden on candi-
dates. This alternative treats all candidates, whether major party,
minor party or independent, according to the same rules.
Although substantial grants to independent and minor party can-
didates on nomination would be a boon to them, the grants would sig-
nificantly increase the cost of public funding or require reductions in
payments to other candidates with better prospects. The grants would
be widely regarded as wasteful.92 By strengthening minor party nomi-
nees, the public funding would work to undermine the two-party sys-
tem, and in some cases cause the vote to be so divided that a candidate
would be elected even though an opponent was preferred by a majority
of the voters.93 At the same time, it is important to avoid what many
would regard as serious unfairness to minor party or independent nom-
inees and to respect constitutional prohibitions of unjustifiable discrim-
ination against those nominees.94
Probably the best approach to public funding in general elections
would be to make initial grants on nomination up to a substantial max-
imum amount based on the number of registered voters in a nominee's
party, or, for an independent nominee, the number of eligible persons
that signed the candidate's nomination papers. In most cases, major
party nominees would receive the maximum initial amount; minor
90. 26 U.S.C. § 9006(b) (Supp. 1983).
91. Id. at §§ 9004, 9005, 9006(b).
92. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 95-98, and cases cited therein.
93. See Barton, The General Election Ballot- More Nominees or More Representative
Nominees?, 22 STAN. L. Rav. 165, 170 (1970).
94. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-98; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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party nominees would receive only a fraction of that amount.95 There-
after, all candidates equally would be entitled to public funds based on
matching of private contributions, limited to their maximum total pub-
lic payment for the election, of course.
If a system of public financing is adopted that provides solely for
matching of private contributions, or for low payments on eligibility,
matching ratios should be high; for example, three or four public dol-
lars for each matchable private dollar contributed. The maximum cu-
mulative matchable contribution from a source ought to be several
hundred dollars; and organizational as well as individual contributions
should be matched. The objective is for most candidates with a reason-
able degree of private support to receive the maximum or substantial
amounts of public funding early in the campaign without undue effort.
If maximum matchable contributions are kept modest, liberal matching
should not cause disproportionate contributor influence.
Public funding based on the matching of private contributions has
several significant advantages. It provides for private rather than gov-
ernment allocation of public funds, which reduces the possibility of of-
ficial discrimination among candidates. Matching gives candidates
reason to solicit modest contributions and citizens incentive to make
those contributions. In theory, if not generally in practice, it permits
minor party and independent candidates to receive as much public
money as major party candidates. Of course, matching does not guar-
antee a minimum amount of money for eligible candidates. Candi-
dates still must obtain the matchable contributions. Furthermore,
participation is more burdensome under a matching system for persons
with lower incomes.
5. Uses ofPublic Funds
Candidates should be allowed to use public funds only to further
their nomination or election.96 Expenditures illegal under state or fed-
95. If this system were adopted, initial public payments to a party's nominee would
increase as that party's registration increased, subject to the maximum limits.
Basing public payments on the number of votes cast for a party or candidate in a past
election is undesirable, given changes in districts or differences in election contests. Votes
for a candidate in a preceding closed primary would be an unsuitable measure because only
persons registered in the candidate's party can vote for the candidate in that primary.
96. Public funds not used for campaign purposes would have to be repaid to the govern-
ment treasury. A candidate might utilize her public funds on campaign expenses and retain
private contributions or use them for non-campaign purposes. This could be prevented by
requiring that private donations not spent for campaign purposes be paid to the state to the
extent that the candidate had received public payments. This policy, however, would en-
courage candidates to spend everything they received, regardless of need. Perhaps a candi-
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eral law should be excluded. Any rebates or kickbacks received by a
candidate as a result of expenditure of public funds should be paid to
the public treasury. Expenditures that are not likely to provide appre-
ciable information about a candidate or campaign issues could be ineli-
gible for public subsidy. By way of illustration, billboards, bumper
strips, buttons, and brief television and radio "spots" might not be cov-
ered, or might be reimbursed only to a limited extent.
The danger is that exclusions from public payments would signifi-
cantly impair some campaigns. Name identification from billboards,
bumper strips, and short broadcast spots is often a legitimate and vital
need of candidates, particularly when opponents are incumbents or
otherwise well-known. Broadcasts longer than one or two minutes are
expensive and often ineffective because it is difficult to attract and
maintain large audiences. Furthermore, candidates can use private
contributions for expenditures not covered by public payments. On
balance, it seems preferable to leave candidates with broad flexibility in
spending public funds. Opponents' criticism and voter reaction will
provide some constraints.97
6. Government Provision of Materials and Services
The state ballot pamphlet, which now contains information on
ballot measures and is mailed to all registered voters,98 should be ex-
panded to include statements by candidates for state office. This
change would economically provide significant information to many
potential voters, as well as greater public control over use of public
funds. The incremental cost would be relatively small, especially when
compared to the cost of each candidate separately mailing a statement
to all registered voters. To limit the expense and bulk of the ballot
pamphlet, only candidates eligible to receive public funding might be
allowed to include statements in the pamphlet.
Apart from expansion of the ballot pamphlet, the state could mail
in the same envelope statements of all candidates for a nomination or
an office at a lesser cost than the candidates acting separately could
mail their statements. It also might be feasible for state presses to print
certain material for candidates. The point, perhaps capable of other
date should be required to pay the state a portion of the private contributions not spent on
the campaign equal to the proportion that private contributions bear to the candidate's total
campaign receipts, public and private.
97. An interesting possibility would be to condition payment of public funds on a can-
didate's compliance with a code of fair campaign practices, created by statute or administra-
tive regulation.
98. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3567.5-3579 (West 1977 & Supp. 1984).
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applications, is that the state may properly be able to provide campaign
assistance more economically, or with more control, through the direct
provision of materials, services, or facilities, rather than by making
payments to candidates.
7. Enforcement of Rules
The rules governing public financing of campaigns need to be
carefully and effectively drawn and enforced, especially because of the
vulnerability of public funding to discredit among citizens. There must
be strong controls to prevent ineligible candidates from receiving funds
and eligible candidates from receiving funds in excess of entitlements.
It is important to assure that candidates expend funds only for proper
purposes. Candidates should be required to deposit public payments in
a separate account, and to maintain a detailed record of expenditures
from that account. Payments from the account should be only by writ-
ten instrument naming the payee, except perhaps for narrowly circum-
scribed petty cash transactions.
There should be appropriate and adequate civil remedies and
criminal sanctions for violation of the public financing laws. In order
to secure effective enforcement, the legislation should authorize the
FPPC, an agency that is relatively free from partisanship and political
pressure, to impose civil penalties, seek injunctive relief, and adopt reg-
ulations to implement the laws.99 The Attorney General and district
attorneys should be responsible for criminal prosecutions and should
also have authority to obtain civil remedies. Finally, careful audits and
field investigations need to be made by an appropriate government
agency to monitor compliance with the law.
There is concern about government financing being manipulated
by legislators or other public officials for incumbent or partisan advan-
tage. °0 For example, available public funds might be reduced without
an increase in contribution limits, thereby prejudicing challengers. Ad-
ministrators might delay or refuse to make payments to candidates.
99. Cf. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 83111-83116, 91001(b), 91005 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982)
(FPPC powers to implement and enforce campaign finance disclosure requirements).
"Attorneys General are mostly elected at the state level. If not, they are appointed on
the basis of partisan activities, and it is always hard to get evenhanded and impartial admin-
istration and enforcement of laws where the officials who are responsible have achieved their
positions as the result of their partisan activity. It's awfully hard for an attorney general to
prosecute someone in his own party, and it is also hard to prosecute someone in the other
party .... " Comments by H. Alexander, supra note 77, at 2.
100. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 248-50 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Polsby,
Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, supra note 74, at 35-41.
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Enforcement officials could conduct baseless investigations of candi-
dates during a campaign.
Official abuses would be protested sharply, however, by aggrieved
candidates and their supporters. Protests would be publicized in the
media, and often would create substantial adverse public reaction to-
ward those committing the abuses. Judges probably would respond se-
verely to unfair partisan--or incumbent-motivated violations of the
public funding laws. For purposes of administration and enforcement,
it is important that statutes be explicit about the amount and timing of
candidate entitlement to public funds. There need to be exacting pen-
alties for willful or negligent violation of candidate rights; and ag-
grieved candidates should be able to obtain prompt, effective judicial
remedies to enforce those rights. Furthermore, the law ought to pro-
vide that contribution limits are removed in elections in which substan-
tially full public funding is not made available. 10'
D. Expenditure Limitations
There may be more public support for limitations on campaign
spending than for any other campaign finance reform. Nonetheless, in
Buckley the Supreme Court held that expenditure limits violate the
First Amendment, except when imposed as a condition on a candi-
date's acceptance of government payment of campaign expenses.' 0 2
Expenditure limits, to the extent that they are constitutionally per-
missible, will prevent gross disparities in spending between opposing
candidates in some campaigns. Despite moderate contribution limits
and substantial public funding, certain candidates, especially incum-
bents, will be able to raise much more money than their opponents
because of name recognition, affluent supporters, pressure on contribu-
tors, advocacy of a zealously supported cause or other factors. Expen-
diture limits would also limit fundraising burdens and pressures on
many candidates. 0 3 These candidates could be more independent in
soliciting and accepting contributions. Finally, expenditure limits
might encourage greater candidate use of volunteers, especially in vari-
101. At some point, severe restrictions on private contributions without sufficient alterna-
tive sources of funds probably would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See
supra note 45.
102. 424 U.S. at 54-58.
103. See Comments by F. Wertheimer, A.B.A. SYMPOSIUM ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING
REGULATION 48 (1975): "IS]pending limits play.., a very critical role in making contribu-
tion limits work, in terms of functioning and of putting a cap on the system, limiting the
incentive. . . to get around the [contribution limits]."
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ous forms of person-to-person campaigning."
Despite their positive aspects, it is questionable whether expendi-
ture limits are desirable if there are strong contribution limits. A prin-
cipal concern is that the limits will be set too low, in particular by
incumbents with their campaign advantages in name recognition and
ability to communicate with the public. Low limits often would
prejudice challengers and preclude substantial competition. Further-
more, candidates may cut expenditures for grassroots volunteer activity
first when limits require spending priorities.
Expenditure limits involve further problems because substantial
campaigns are much more costly in some districts than in others as a
consequence of variations in media, political organization, and the ac-
cessibility of voters. In addition, competitive campaigns against in-
cumbents or well-known candidates may require greater expenditures
than against other opponents. It would not be practical, however, to fix
different limits for different districts, let alone for different types of can-
didates, because the relevant campaign cost variables are too numerous
and complex. Limits could be varied for differences in population or
registered voters, but these factors account for only a small part of the
differences in campaign costs.
Enforcement of expenditure limits is difficult. Obviously, there are
strong motives and numerous ways to spend money and other re-
sources on behalf of candidates. To the extent that limits are not en-
forceable or enforced, law-abiding candidates will be disadvantaged.
Independent expenditures may be used to avoid spending limits, just as
they are used to circumvent contribution limits.105 These independent
expenditures could be a significant factor in some election contests. To
limit their effect, the legislature would need to adopt the most restric-
tive definition of independent expenditures constitutionally permissi-
ble."06 Furthermore, a low limit might be set on the size of
contributions to those making independent expenditures but the consti-
tutionality of that kind of limitation is uncertain." 7
104. In order to enact and maintain government financing of campaigns, it may be neces-
sary to combine the government funding with the much more popular expenditure limits.
105. See text accompanying note 54.
106. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 46-47, particularly n.53; see also supra note 54.
107. Buckley held that restrictions on independent expenditures were unconstitutional
because they were not justified by a sufficient public interest. The Court concluded that the
record did not show that the restrictions served materially to prevent improper influence or
the appearance of improper influence with officeholders. 424 U.S. at 39-51.
In upholding limits on contributions to candidates, on the other hand, the Court indi-
cated that contribution limits interfere less with protected First Amendment interests, or
perhaps are subject to a less demanding constitutional standard. The Court reasoned: "A
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If expenditure limits are imposed despite the problems that they
involve, they should be set relatively high, even though this means that
they lose much of their positive effect. The legislature should include a
formula to adjust the limits so that they rise automatically with sub-
stantial increases in the price level and the number of registered voters.
Candidates who accept public funds, thereby subjecting themselves to
limits, ought to be permitted to spend extra sums to the extent that their
non-publicly funded opponents spend in excess of those limits. More-
over, the publicly funded candidates probably should be given addi-
tional public funds equal to the excess spent by their opponents, up to a
specified maximum. Candidates making excess expenditures should be
required to give timely advance notice to their publicly funded oppo-
nents before making the expenditures.108
IV. Conclusion: The Legislative Situation
A number of comprehensive campaign finance reform bills have
been introduced in the California Legislature during the past dec-
ade.109 The bills have provided for substantial public funding in gen-
eral, and usually, primary elections, tight restraints on contributions,
limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organiza-
tion. . . involves little direct restraint on ... political communication, for it permits the
symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe
the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. . . . [The transformation of
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contribu-
tor.... The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly
with the size of his contribution. ... Id. at 27. Furthermore, in California Medical Ass'n
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), the Court upheld limits on contributions
not to a candidate but to a committee that made contributions to candidates.
It is not clear, however, that the Court would find a state interest sufficient to limit
contributions that could be used only for independent expenditures. In Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) the Court held invalid a limitation on
contributions for purposes of ballot measure campaign expenditures. The Court seemingly
gave more First Amendment protection to campaign contributions than it had indicated in
Buckley. The majority declared: "Contributions by individuals to support concerted action
by a committee advocating a position on a ballot measure is beyond question a very signifi-
cant form of political expression." Id. at 298. The Court asserted that, under Buckley, con-
tribution limits are permissible only when used to prevent contributors from securing "'a
political quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders" or when used to avoid
"'the appearance of improper influence."' 454 U.S. at 297 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. at 26-27). Applying the Court's analysis, limits on contributions for independent ex-
penditures arguably are constitutionally unjustified.
108. The purpose of the advance notice requirement, of course, is to give opponents a
fair opportunity to obtain and use effectively additional private contributions and, if avail-
able, public treasury payments. It is uncertain whether the courts would regard this purpose
as sufficient to justify the notice requirement. See the discussion of this issue, supra note 62.
109. See, e.g., A.B. 3178 (1982); A.B. 2927 (1980); A.B. 1372 (1977). These bills have
been based largely on carefully worked out proposals put forth by Common Cause, an or-
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and limits on expenditures. By imposing low contribution limits and
offering liberal amounts of government funding, the bills have been
designed to induce most candidates to accept public financing, with the
limits on expenditures and other regulations that are attached to that
financing.
Despite considerable "lip service," until recently the bills have had
few legislative supporters, and have received little consideration in
state senate and assembly election committees. A number of legislators
have favored limits on contributions or expenditures, but most have
opposed public funding. They have not wanted to finance challengers
more adequately, and thereby lose part of their fundraising and other
campaign advantages as incumbents. In addition, legislators have ex-
perienced little constituent demand for public financing. Indeed, legis-
lators feel that the public, for the most part, opposes using tax dollars to
pay for campaigns, despite ambiguous polls showing majority approval
for the general concept. ' The Republicans generally have not sup-
ported major reform, seemingly because they have thought that the
present system gives them a fundraising advantage over the Democrats.
Environmentalists, consumers, taxpayers and other groups that seem-
ingly would benefit significantly have not put much effort into cam-
paign finance reform; these groups have been occupied with issues that
apparently relate more immediately to their interests.
In the last two years, however, legislators seem to have changed
their attitude toward campaign finance reforms considerably. In 1982,
the Assembly for the first time passed a comprehensive bill providing
substantial public funding for campaigns."' This year bills have
passed both the Assembly" 2 and Senate;"13 these different bills are now
ganization concerned with reform of the political system and government structure and
process.
110. See, e.g., Pfautch, Campaign Finance: The Signalsfrom the Polls, PUBLIC OPINION
52 (Aug./Sept. 1980). (In a Gallup Poll 57% of respondents answered that it was a "good
idea" that "the federal government provide a fixed amount of money for the election cam-
paign of candidates for Congress and that all private contributions from other sources be
prohibited.").
111. A.B. 3178 (1982).
112. A.B. 12 (1983). As amended through February, 1984, the bill provides large
amounts of public funding in general elections for candidates for the legislature who meet
high monetary thresholds. Public payments are based on matching of private contributions
up to $1,000. There are single-source limitations on contributions of $1,000 for individuals
and $3,000 for organizations, and aggregate limits on contributions by certain organizations.
Expenditure limits, which are 50% higher than maximum public payments, apply to candi-
dates who receive public funds; these candidates may exceed the limits if their opponents
spend greater amounts.
113. S.B. 87 (1983).
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before a special two-house joint committee.' 14 There appears to be
new Republican openness, and perhaps ultimately support, for public
financing as well as for contribution and expenditure limits.1 5
Legislators from both parties seem to be growing weary of solicit-
ing ever increasing amounts of money for their campaigns." 6 Many
apparently find this task one of the most burdensome and distasteful
aspects of politics, and are sensitive to the adverse publicity often in-
volved. There is considerable anxiety about expensive campaigns by
challengers. There also seems to be growing public concern and dissat-
isfaction with the present system. Even special interest groups some-
times appear to be tiring of the constant demands and pressures upon
them for contributions, especially since many times they receive little in
return.
Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that California will soon enact
the kind of broad reforms proposed in this article, especially with a
conservative Republican governor and the state government's per-
ceived financial problems. It is doubtful whether enough incumbents,
let alone influential special interest groups, will feel that these reforms
will be advantageous, or at least not materially harmful, to them. And
there is danger that any reforms that are enacted will unduly favor in-
cumbents-for example, by requiring high thresholds for eligibility for
public funds, by not providing public funding in primary elections, or
by low contribution limits. It must be recognized that "in dealing with
campaign finance laws we are dealing with the heart of political
power-how it is obtained, how it is exercised, who it may or may not
benefit. Incumbents, . .. [p]arties . . . , and ...powerful interest
114. The understanding apparently is that this Joint Committee on Campaign and Elec-
tion Reform will review the entire subject of campaign finance reform, hold public hearings,
and make recommendations to the two houses of the legislature early in 1984. The amended
version of A.B. 12, supra note 112, has become the single bill with which the legislators are
working.
115. See Lembke,.4 Bipartisan Pushfor Some Campaign Finance Reforms, CAL. J. 155-
57 (Apr. 1983). Republicans may be more amenable to campaign finance reform because in
the 1982 campaign they were at a financial disadvantage as a result of the success of Demo-
cratic legislative leaders in raising large suins from sources with economic stakes in legisla-
tive decisions. Id. at 156; See also supra note 21. In the 1982 general elections, median
expenditures by Democratic candidates in State Assembly races increased from $69,000 to
$81,000; on the other hand, median expenditures by Republican candidates in those legisla-
tive races declined from $69,000 to $61,000. FPPC, Campaign Receots and Expenditures by
State Candidates, supra note 28. Democrats, however, apparently remain fearful of Repub-
lican fundraising abilities.
116. "Assembly Minority Leader [Robert] Naylor laments 'the inordinate amount of
time we spend raising money around here. Every year, the ante gets raised dramati-
cally. . .. I'm convinced its having some adverse effect on the objectivity of the legislative
process.'" Lembke, supra note 115, at 157.
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groups all approach this issue with intense ferocity."
'' 1 7
Over time however, campaign finance reforms similar to those
proposed here will gain support and will be adopted, possibly by initia-
tive. The defects of the present methods of financing campaigns are too
egregious. Alternatives must be enacted that will make the election
process and government more representative and evenhanded.
117. Letter from Archibald Cox to Common Cause Members (Fall, 1983).
